

A COMPONENT-BASED APPROACH TO HYBRID SYSTEMS SAFETY VERIFICATION

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OVERVIEW

- Background
 - Cyber-Physical System
 - Hybrid System Models
 - Component-based Modeling

- Component-based Modeling and Verification Approach
 - Components
 - Interfaces
 - Contracts
 - Composition Retains Contract

- Conclusion and Future Work

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
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BACKGROUND

■ Cyber-physical systems (CPS)

- Cyber** and **physical** capabilities
- Continuous physical-part: vehicle movement,...
- Discrete cyber-part: vehicle steering,...
- Often safety-critical!




■ Hybrid system models – Model and analyze CPS

- Hybrid programs: program notation for hybrid system modeling
- Safety Analysis:
 - $\Phi \rightarrow [\alpha]\Psi$...starting in Φ , each run of α leads to a safe state Ψ
 - Verified using Theorem Prover – KeYmaera
- Challenging for large monolithic models

■ Component-based hybrid system modeling and verification

- Component verification results do **not always transfer** to composite

→ **Component-based approach to hybrid system safety verification**



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RUNNING EXAMPLE - VEHICLE CRUISE CONTROL

■ Vehicle Cruise Control System

- Overall Safety Property: Keep vehicle's velocity within bounds
- Split into two components

■ Actuator Component

- Receives target velocity
- Chooses target acceleration, such that target velocity can be reached
- Outputs actual velocity

■ Cruise Controller Component

- Receives actual velocity
- Chooses target velocity
- Outputs target velocity

DEFINITION 2: COMPONENT

■ Component $C = (ctrl, plant)$

■ *ctrl*

- Discrete control part
- NO continuous parts

■ *plant*

- Continuous part
- $\{x'_1 = \theta_1, \dots, x'_n = \theta_n \ \& \ H\}$
- Ordinary differential equations
- Evolution domain H



■ Actuator: $C_{ac} = (ctrl_{ac}, plant_{ac})$

□ $ctrl_{ac} \equiv$ choose a , such that v^{tr} is reached until ϵ

□ $plant_{ac} \equiv$ evolve v with rate a for at most ϵ

■ Cruise Control Component

□ Choose target velocity



DEFINITION 3: INTERFACE

■ Interface $I = (V^{in}, \pi^{in}, V^{out}, \pi^{out})$

■ V^{in} ...variables for input ports

■ π^{in} ...input assumptions

■ V^{out} ...variables for output ports

■ π^{out} ...output guarantees

■ Actuator: I_{ac}

□ $V^{in} = \{v^{tr}\}$...target velocity

□ $\pi^{in}(v^{tr}) \equiv$ target velocity v^{tr} in velocity interval


□ $V^{out} = \{v\}$...current velocity

□ $\pi^{out}(v) \equiv$ current velocity v in velocity interval

■ Cruise Control Component

□ Reads current velocity

□ Provides calculated target velocity




DEFINITION 4: CONTRACT

- Contract

- Initial state ϕ
- Target state ψ

- $\text{Cont}(C, I) \equiv$



- $\psi \equiv \psi^{safe} \wedge \Pi^{out}$

- Actuator: (1)

- $\phi \equiv$ Vehicle initially stopped and ...
- $\psi \equiv$ vehicle velocity always in interval

- Cruise Controller Component:

- Target velocity always in interval

- Verified using KeYmaera

THEOREM 1: COMPOSITION RETAINS CONTRACTS

- Let...
 - (C_1, I_1) and (C_2, I_2) be Components with Interfaces
 - $Cont(C_1, I_1)$ and $Cont(C_2, I_2)$ verified
 - Compatible (Def. 6)
 - $(C_3, I_3) = (C_1, I_1) || (C_2, I_2)$ (Def. 5)
- Then $Cont(C_3, I_3)$ is also valid, with...
 - $\phi_3 \equiv \phi_1 \wedge \phi_2$
both initial states hold
 - $\psi_3 \equiv \psi_1 \wedge \psi_2$
both safety properties and all output properties hold
- Two Components
 - Actuator and Cruise Controller
- Actuator Contract verified
 - $\psi_{ac} \equiv$ vehicle velocity always in interval
- Cruise Controller Contract verified
 - $\psi_{cc} \equiv$ target velocity always in interval
- Compatible Composite
 - $(C_{sys}, I_{sys}) = (C_{ac}, I_{ac}) || (C_{cc}, I_{cc})$
 - $\phi_{sys} \equiv \phi_{ac} \wedge \phi_{cc}$
 - $\psi_{sys} \equiv \psi_{ac} \wedge \psi_{cc}$
 - → vehicle velocity always in interval

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CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

- We presented a technique to model and verify component-based CPS
 - Split system into components
 - Verify Components
 - Rebuild system from components
 - → Transfer Verification Results!

- Future Work
 - Extend interface and port capabilities
 - Implement framework as tool
 - Add further composition operations
 - Delayed transmission
 - Erroneous transmission

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